Payee for EAJA fees, with
protective client agreement
by Sarah H. Bohr
Excerpted from
Social Security
Issues Annotated
In Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246 (10th
Cir. 2007), cert denied, 129 S.Ct. 486, 172 L.Ed.2d 355
(U.S. Nov. 3, 2008) (NO. 07-1468), and Reeves v. Astrue, 526
F.3d 732, 735 (11th h Cir. 2008), cert denied, 129
S.Ct. 724 (U.S. Dec, 8, 2008) (NO. 08-5605), the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits ruled that attorneys-fee awards under the EAJA may be
offset for the federally-collectable debts of the client instead of
paying the attorneys’ fees. Although the courts made awards of
attorney’s fees under the EAJA in both cases, in each instance the
government, using the Treasury Offset Program, 31 U.S.C. § 3716,
used the award to instead pay a debt owed by the party, leaving the
attorney’s fee unpaid. In Manning the debt was for a
student loan, and in Reeves it was for child support, but the
federal government has the authority to collect a wide variety of
debts using the Treasury Offset Program. While both courts
acknowledged that the purpose of the Equal Access to Justice Act was
to pay for attorneys’ fees, they concluded that because the right to
an attorneys-fee award is given to the client rather than the
lawyer, the award was the property of the client, subject to offset
for the client’s debts.
The same question was considered by the Eighth
Circuit in Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800 (8th
Cir. 2008) (Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Dec. 5,
2008), but it reached the opposite conclusion. The Eighth Circuit
ruled that the EAJA fee must be paid to the attorney.
In Marre v. United States, 117 F.3d 297
(5th Cir. 1997), the Fifth Circuit rejected a Government
attempt to collect the debt of a party from an award of fees under
Section 7430 of the Internal Revenue Code—a statute which uses
similar language to the EAJA. The Government agrees that
Marre prevents it from pursuing offsets against EAJA fees for
the debts of the party in the Fifth Circuit. See Stephens
v. Apfel, 539 F. Supp. 2d 802, 819 (D.
Md.
2008). Given the split in the circuits, it is possible that
the Supreme Court will resolve the conflict, so no one can be
confident the law that currently prevails in his circuit will apply
in the future.
Applicable Statute
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (2006) provides in
relevant part:
(1) (A) Except as otherwise specifically
provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other
than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any
costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in
any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including
proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or
against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that
action, unless the court finds that the position of the United
States was substantially justified or that special circumstances
make an award unjust.
Applicable Case Law
Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether
attorneys fee awards under EAJA must pay the attorney’s fees, or if
the award can be used to provide debt relief.
Fifth Circuit
In Marre v. United States,
117 F.3d 297, 304 (5th Cir. 1997), the Fifth Circuit
rejected the Government’s attempt to offset the debt of a party
against an award of fees under Section 7430 of the Internal Revenue
Code—a statute which uses similar language to the EAJA. The court
reasoned that the real party in interest when fees are awarded is
the attorney, notwithstanding that the award is to the prevailing
party. The Government agrees that Marre prevents it from
pursuing offsets against EAJA fees for the debts of the party in the
Fifth Circuit. See Stephens v. Apfel, 539
F. Supp. 2d 802, 819 (D. Md. 2008).
Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit, in King v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 230 Fed. Appx. 476 (6th Cir. Mar. 28,
2007) has only addressed the question in an unpublished case,
concluding that the award of attorneys fees was dependent on the
obligation to use the award to pay the fees of the attorney.
Eighth Circuit
In Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800 (8th
Cir. 2008) (Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Dec. 5, 2008),
the Eighth Circuit ruled that the EAJA fee must be paid to the
attorney. While the panel opinion seemed to encourage the Government
to petition for en banc rehearing, the petitions for
rehearing were denied.
Tenth Circuit
In Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246 (10th
Cir. 2007(, cert denied, 129 S.Ct. 486, 172 L.Ed.2d 355 (U.S.
Nov. 3, 2008) (NO. 07-1468), the Tenth Circuit ruled that
attorneys-fee awards under the EAJA may be offset for the
federally-collectable debts of the client instead of paying the
attorneys’ fees. Although the court made an award of attorney’s fees
under the EAJA , the government, using the Treasury Offset Program,
31 U.S.C. § 3716 (2006), used the award to instead pay a debt owed
by the party, leaving the attorney’s fee unpaid. In Manning the debt
was for a student loan. While the court acknowledged that the
purpose of the Equal Access to Justice Act was to pay for attorneys’
fees, it concluded that because the attorneys-fee award is made to
the prevailing party rather than the lawyer, the award was the
property of the client, subject to offset for the client’s debts.
The Supreme Court has denied cert.
Eleventh Circuit
In Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 735
(11th Cir. 2008), cert denied, 129 S.Ct. 724
U.S. Dec. 8, 2008), the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Eighth
Circuit's decision in Manning, holding that attorneys-fee
awards under the EAJA may be offset for the federally-collectable
debts of the client without paying the attorneys’ fees. Although the
court awarded attorney’s fees under the EAJA, using the Treasury
Offset Program, 31 U.S.C. § 3716 (2006), it used the award to
instead pay a debt owed by Reeves for child support.